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As one of the EU’s most powerful states, France will have a large say over the final outcome of the Brexit
negotiations. Andrew Glencross assesses how Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the French
presidential elections will impact on the process. Macron could pursue a tougher line on Brexit than
his predecessor, while the current border arrangements between the UK and France could also be
up for renegotiation.
Amidst the turbulent past few weeks of UK-EU Brexit wrangling, relatively little attention has been paid to the effect
the election of a new French president will have on these negotiations. UK tabloids have been busy instead making
hay with their preferred EU bogey-figures, namely Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker, who are both portrayed
as bullies embittered by the very notion that a member state wants to leave the club. The victory of Emmanuel
Macron – the insider’s outsider –suddenly means there could be another leader that comes to embody EU hostility
to the UK after the Brexit referendum.
Macron’s win is a boon for Europe’s stockmarkets as he shares the pro-EU, pro-euro outlook that characterises
Juncker, Merkel, and other powerful brokers of the Brexit talks. The opposite, of course, was true of his opponent in
the run-off vote: Marine Le Pen. Where these two candidates also differed markedly, therefore, was on their attitude
to how the UK should leave the EU.
During the tetchy drama of the presidential TV debate, Macron was at pains to explain to Le Pen that leaving the EU
– which she had threatened to do by calling a British-style In/Out referendum – inevitably carries a large exit bill. In
other words, the new French President can be expected to support a hard line on this aspect of the Article 50
negotiations. Here France will be singing from the same hymn sheet as Germany: both Merkel and her rival for the
German chancellorship, Martin Schulz, insist that a settlement of the UK’s liabilities to the EU is a precondition for
talking about a new free trade deal.
Another reason the UK may find itself at odds with France under Macron concerns the status of the border
arrangement covered by the 2003 treaty of Le Touquet. It is this treaty that allows UK authorities to be based at
French ferry ports in order to carry out passport checks; a similar rule applies for the Channel Tunnel. In effect, this
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system means the UK border authorities can filter out travellers without proper documentation, thereby reducing the
number of people able to claim asylum upon landing on British soil. That is a big advantage as the French
authorities may otherwise have an incentive to allow people to transit to Britain, because then they become
someone else’s responsibility.
The Le Touquet Treaty is a bilateral agreement that has no relation to the EU or EU law. In principle, nothing stops
this arrangement from continuing after Brexit. What it depends on is the willingness of the French government to
stick to the deal and Macron is on record as saying he would seek to renegotiate this agreement. The deal is
unpopular with the French public and several candidates made it a topic in their campaigns. Whether the new
president is prepared, with the electioneering out of the way, to take a stance contrary to UK interests remains to be
seen.
The problem, from a British perspective, is that the Brexit talks offer more avenues where France could play
hardball. That would certainly be in line with Macron’s overall philosophy on the matter, which is best captured in his
campaign quip that “the best trade agreement for Britain is called membership of the EU”. He has also made no
secret of coveting the relocation of bankers and EU agencies, such as the European Banking Authority, from London
to Paris. Indeed, the official EU negotiating stance is that the UK needs to cover the costs associated with moving
agencies back to a member state.
Equally, discussions over a UK-EU free trade arrangement to replace EU membership will provide Macron with
broader scope for promoting French interests. Issues of regulatory equivalence, the term used to designate mutually
agreed standards for selling goods and services, will be central to this deal. It is thus quite plausible to imagine that
the new French president will seek terms of equivalence that reduce the UK’s ability to deregulate in areas such as
financial services. That would be a way to protect French banking and encourage a maximum degree of job
relocation to Paris.
Whatever the exact outcome of the Brexit bargaining, the British government and the British electorate can expect a
very different presidency from that of François Hollande. France’s outgoing leader was very much a quiet
Frenchman who lacked domestic support and international credibility. His opinions on Brexit barely registered in the
UK, which explains why David Cameron’s EU renegotiation was always preoccupied with winning concessions from
Germany. Although a former minister to Hollande, Macron is keenly aware that he cannot make the same mistakes
as his predecessor. Brexit offers the new president a chance for France to regain its standing in the EU system,
which is why the UK government will need to stop focusing all its attention on German politics.
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